Users & groups

Users and groups are the identity layer of Taranac. A user is an account; a group bundles users together and carries the policy-relevant attributes. Together they answer the WHO dimension of every AAA decision: when a TACACS+ or RADIUS request arrives, Taranac matches the authenticated identity (and the groups it belongs to) against your AAA policy rules. The same accounts and groups also govern who can sign in to the Taranac admin UI, and what they are allowed to do there.

Identities come from one of two sources. Local users live entirely in Taranac and are managed on these pages. Directory users (auth_source = ldap) are mirrored in from a directory — Active Directory, OpenLDAP, FreeIPA or another LDAP server — by the sync engine; they appear in the same lists but are largely read-only here. This page covers local accounts and group membership; for directory-sourced identities see LDAP directories.

A user has no role of its own. Permissions, admin rights, and MFA enforcement are all derived from the groups the user belongs to. An account in no groups can still authenticate to network devices through AAA policy, but has no access to the admin UI.

Open Infrastructure → Identity → Users. The list is searchable, filterable, and sortable, with columns for username, email, name, groups, status, locked state, source, validity, last login, and Used by (how many objects reference the account — see Deleting). Filters cover status (active/inactive), locked, source (local/ldap), and validity (valid / expired / pending). Search matches a substring, case-insensitively, across username, email and names.

The Users list — group badges, status, source and validity at a glance.

Click New and fill in the form:

Passwords are validated against the password policy, hashed with argon2id, and recorded in password history. Since 1.2.0 the policy lives in the backend and is applied identically everywhere a password is set or changed — the admin form, the welcome/reset links, and every login path — rather than being duplicated per screen. You edit it under System → Authentication & Sessions; it ships as minimum 12 characters requiring an upper-case letter, a lower-case letter, a digit and a special character, with password expiry at 90 days, the last 5 passwords remembered, and an expiry warning 14 days ahead. A rejected password comes back with every rule it violated, listed individually.

For local users Taranac also derives an NT password hash, which is what RADIUS MS-CHAP / PEAP MSCHAPv2 authentication needs — so a local user can be used for 802.1X without any extra step. Directory users have no NT hash stored in Taranac; the MS-CHAPv2 verifier for them comes from the directory itself (a domain controller for Active Directory, or ipaNTHash read at login for FreeIPA — see LDAP directories).

In edit mode the page shows the form alongside read-only metadata, MFA status, and linked PKI certificates.

• Change password is a collapsible section — leave it empty to keep the current password.
• Lock / Unlock is independent of the active flag: a locked account fails authentication even while active. Unlocking also resets the failed-login counter. Repeated automatic failures can auto-lock an account until a timeout passes; a manual lock stays until an admin unlocks it.
• Delete is blocked for your own account and for directory users. It is also blocked while the account is referenced — by an AAA policy rule, an NCM just-in-time credential, an active lease — and the refusal itemises what is holding it rather than cascading silently (see References — “where used”). Once it goes through, deleting a user automatically revokes their active PKI user certificates and detaches any device certificates that were linked to them.

Open Infrastructure → Identity → Groups. Columns show name, source, the Admin and MFA flags, Web login (the resolved console-access answer — see Web console access), the member count (click it to preview members), Used by, and the creation date.

The Groups list — admin and MFA flags are the levers that matter.

When you create or edit a group you set:

Three of those fields are administrator-only, not merely groups.edit: the RBAC model, the admin flag, and (since 1.2.8) web console access. Each rewrites what every member of the group can reach, so a plain edit permission must not confer them — before 1.2.2 anyone who could edit groups could point their own group at a privileged RBAC model and simply log in again. Membership of an admin group is administrator-only for the same reason.

The Members panel lets you add and remove users (changes are saved together with the form). You can also create a brand-new user inline while building a group. Deleting a group is refused while anything still references it, with the references listed (see References — “where used”).

A directory synced for the sake of NAC and AAA policy brings in policy subjects, not console operators. An AD Domain Users mirror is thousands of accounts, and every one of them used to be a valid credential pair against the management interface. The only lever that existed was is_active = false — and that is not a console switch at all: the TACACS+ user cache reads the same column (it loads WHERE is_active = true), so switching it off removes the person from AAA as well, from precisely what the directory was synced for.

Since 1.2.8 the decision is made once, for the whole installation. A group carries a three-state Web console access mode (web_login_mode), resolved against an installation-wide default:

The default is the setting auth.web_login_default, edited under System → Authentication & Sessions (/settings/authentication) in the Web Console Access section. It ships as allow, so an upgrade changes nothing about who can log in.

inherit is what makes that default retroactive. Because every untouched group already sits in it, flipping the setting to deny closes the hundred groups already synced and every group the directory creates tomorrow — without a single write to the groups table. A per-group flag could never do that: sync assigns policy only to groups it creates, so a default chosen today would never reach the ninety already there.

Resolved across all of a person’s groups, in this order:

1. Any admin group (is_admins) → allowed. An administrator can never be shut out — otherwise the mode would be a way to lose access to your own installation.
2. Otherwise any group set to Deny → denied. Explicit beats inherited, and among non-admin groups deny beats allow: membership in one permissive group must not undo a deny inherited from another.
3. Otherwise any group set to Allow → allowed. This is what carries the exception in a deny-by-default installation — mark the handful of groups that need the console and never touch the rest.
4. Nobody decided → the installation default.

A missing or unreadable setting reads as allow: failing closed would turn a lost settings row into “nobody can sign in”, with no console left to fix it from.

The check runs before the password is verified, and that ordering is the security property rather than an optimisation. Verifying first would still issue the LDAP bind — which is what turns the login form into a password-spraying front end for your directory, with wrong guesses reaching the DC and feeding its lockout counters. The refusal is the ordinary vague invalid credentials, so the gate cannot be used to ask “does this account exist, and may it use the UI”; the real reason goes to the audit log as USER_LOGIN_FAILED with reason = web_login_denied. The gate is re-checked at the MFA step too, so closing a group takes effect on someone already standing at the factor prompt.

It closes the console, not the account:

• Password reset by email keeps working. It must: the same password authenticates the person over TACACS+ / RADIUS / NAC, and a reset recomputes the NT hash used by PEAP MSCHAPv2 — closing it would take away a denied group’s only way to change its network password. It is not a way in either: a reset issues no session and revokes every refresh token.
• The certificate download link and the MFA setup link keep working — both are public, one-time-token endpoints that never go through login.
• AAA and NAC are unaffected either way. In particular the BYOD captive portal deliberately does not inherit the gate: it shares the same authentication core, and taking someone’s console away must not take their network with it. See Captive portal.

• The Groups list’s Web login column reports the resolved answer, not the stored one, and marks which groups merely inherited it: Allowed for an explicit allow, Denied for a group that chose it, Denied (default) for one sitting on a deny-by-default installation’s setting, and a dash where the group resolves to allow without having said so.
• Moving a group off System default requires administrator rights in either direction — in a deny-by-default installation Allow opens the console just as decisively as Deny closes it.
• web_login_mode is deliberately one of the few fields you may set on a directory-synced group. That population is the reason the mode exists.
• A group cannot be both an admin group and Deny. is_admins wins at login, so such a group would say one thing and do another; the combination is refused on save instead of being resolved silently. Allow alongside the admin flag is merely redundant, and is accepted.
• On a group set to Deny, the RBAC model picker goes read-only — assigning a role to a group that cannot reach the console is meaningless. The existing assignment stays visible: nothing was deleted, and that has to be something you can see. Switch the access back and the role applies again. A group left on System default keeps its picker editable, since it has not decided anything yet.

A user’s effective UI/API permissions are resolved through their groups:

User → Groups → Group.rbac_model → permissions

If the user belongs to any group flagged as an admin group, they get full access and all permission checks are skipped. Otherwise their permissions are the union of every group’s RBAC model. A user with no group — or whose groups have no RBAC model and no admin flag — cannot use the admin UI. MFA enforcement follows the same logic: if any of the user’s groups requires MFA, MFA is mandatory at login.

Permissions are only the second question. Web console access is asked first, before the password is even verified: a user whose groups resolve to deny never reaches the point where an RBAC model would matter.

AAA policy rules match on WHO (users and/or groups), WHERE (devices/device groups), and WHEN. A rule can target specific users, one or more groups, or any identity. At request time Taranac evaluates the authenticated user together with all the groups it belongs to, so adding a user to the right group is usually all it takes to grant device access — no rule edit required. See AAA policy.

For TACACS+ device administration, the enable (privilege escalation) password is resolved through an inheritance chain, with the first explicit (non-inherit) setting winning:

User → Group → TACACS+ profile → Global default

Each enable_mode can be:

If a user is in several groups that each define an enable mode, the most recently updated group wins. Custom enable passwords are stored encrypted; revealing one in the UI is audit-logged.

Local accounts can carry an optional valid-from / valid-until window. Outside the window the account is rejected at login, at token refresh, and on every API request — a soft but consistently enforced expiry. Leave a bound empty for “no restriction”. These fields apply to local users only; directory users have no validity window in Taranac.

Since 1.1.0, users and groups are protected by referential integrity rather than by a silent cascade. Both lists carry a Used by column, and both delete flows open a drawer listing exactly what still points at the object — an AAA or NAC policy rule, a credential, a lease. The delete is refused with that itemised list instead of failing opaquely or quietly stripping the reference. Unassign or repoint the references first, then delete.

• A new network engineer. Create a local user, add them to a “Network Admins” group that has an RBAC model (or the admin flag) plus a TACACS+-friendly enable mode. They can now log in to the UI and administer devices governed by AAA rules that target that group.
• A contractor with an end date. Create a local user and set valid-until to the contract end date. Access stops automatically — no cleanup reminder needed.
• Granting AD users access without recreating them. Let LDAP sync import the AD security group, then set its RBAC model / admin flag here. AD members gain Taranac access on their next login; you never manage their passwords.
• A 802.1X service/user account. A local user automatically has the NT hash needed for MS-CHAP / PEAP, so it can be referenced by NAC and RADIUS flows with no extra configuration.
• Forcing step-up auth for sensitive staff. Turn on Require MFA on the group rather than per user — it overrides individual settings for everyone in it.
• A directory synced only for NAC/AAA policy. Set the installation default under System → Authentication & Sessions to Deny, then set Web console access = Allow on the two or three groups that actually operate Taranac. Every synced group — including the ones the directory creates next month — is closed to the management UI, while TACACS+, RADIUS, NAC and the BYOD portal carry on exactly as before. See Web console access.

• LDAP directories — sync directory users and groups.
• Roles & permissions — what RBAC models actually grant.
• Multi-factor (MFA) — enrollment and enforcement.
• AAA policy — how users and groups feed the WHO dimension.
• Captive portal — the BYOD flow that a console deny deliberately leaves open.
• TACACS+ — enable handling and shell profiles.
• Project repository